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REMITTITUR ABOLISHED As AN UNNECESSARY PRACTICE LEADING
To INCONSISTENT RESULTS
Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp.,
693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
In Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp.,' the Missouri
Supreme Court became the first state court to abolish the power of
remittitur.2
Sally Firestone sustained severe injuries when suspended skywalks col-
lapsed at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.3 Firestone
brought suit against the owner of the hotel, Crown Center Redevelop-
ment Corp. (Crown Center), to recover compensatory damages.' The
jury awarded Firestone damages of fifteen million dollars as compensa-
tion for her injuries.5 The trial judge, however, stating that the damage
award was excessive, ordered Firestone to accept a 2.25 million dollar
reduction in her award. If Firestone refused, the court would grant
Crown Center a new trial.6 Firestone accepted the remittitur,7 but
Crown Center appealed, claiming that the award was still excessive.8
1. 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
2. If the ... court determines that the verdict in a case is excessive, it may order a
complete new trial or a new trial limited to the issue of damages.... ITlhe court may
condition a denial of the motion for a new trial upon the filing by the plaintiff of a remitti-
tur, in a stated amount, and in this way give the plaintiff the option either of submitting to
a new trial or accepting the amount of damages which the court considers justified ....
The one important limitation on use of remittiturs is that they are not proper where the
verdict was the result of passion and prejudice, since such prejudice may have infected all
the decision of the jury.
3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1305.1 (Wright ed. 1958) (foot-
notes omitted).
3. 693 S.W.2d at 101. The collapse occurred on July 17, 1981, killing 114 people and injuring
scores of others. Id.
4. The amount of compensatory damages was the only issue of fact to be decided because
Crown Center and others involved in the design, construction, ownership, and operation of the hotel
entered into a settlement agreement with the representatives of those killed or injured in the skywalk
collapse. Id. at 104-05. Crown Center and the other defendants admitted liability and agreed to pay
a total of $20,000,000 in punitive damages to be distributed among the victims. Id. at 103, 104-05.
In exchange, the plaintiffs agreed not to present evidence of the defendants' conduct. Id. at 105.
5. Id. at 101. The jury awarded the verdict to compensate Firestone for extensive head and
spinal injuries suffered in the accident. Firestone, rendered a quadriplegic, spent seven months in
medical facilities undergoing operations, tests, and rehabilitation. She continues to need constant
medical attention, specialized equipment, and physical and emotional therapy. Id. at 109.
6. Id. at 101.
7. Id.
8. Crown Center requested reversal and remand for a new trial, or alternatively, a further
reduction of the verdict to $7,500,000. Id.
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Firestone cross-appealed 9 for restoration of the jury verdict.' The Mis-
souri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment and trans-
ferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court." The Supreme Court
reinstated the jury verdict and held: the power of remittitur is "abol-
ished" in Missouri.12
In the United States, Judge Story (later Justice Story) in Blunt v. Little
became the first judge to exercise the power of remittitur.'3 Judge Story
did not cite any authority or offer any justification for his exercise of this
judicial power.14 In 1866, the United States Supreme Court summarily
approved of the power of remittitur in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Her-
bert. 5 In 1935, however, in Dimick v. Schiedt,16 the Court questioned
9. Many courts will not allow a plaintiff to appeal after he has agreed to a remittitur. See, e.g.,
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (per curiam) ("[A] plaintiff in federal court
... may not appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted."). Missouri followed a similar rule: a
plaintiff who consents to a remittitur may not question the validity of the court's order after ac-
cepting it. See Webb v. Rench, 476 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Mo. 1972); Carver v. Missouri-Ks.-Tex. R.R.,
362 Mo. 897, 917, 245 S.W.2d 96, 105-06 (1952). In 1977, the Missouri Supreme Court modified
that rule to allow appellate court review of the remittitur "as to excessiveness as well as inadequacy"
when the defendant requests further remittitur. Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780,
789 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). In 1981, the Missouri legislature codified that modification in Rule of
Civil Procedure 78.10:
Consenting to a remittitur as a condition to the denial of a new trial does not preclude the
consenting party from asserting on appeal that the amount of the remittitur is excessive. A
party consenting to a remittitur may not initiate the appeal on that ground but may raise
the same on the other party's appeal.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 78.10.
10. 693 S.W.2d at 101.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 110. See also Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
Kenton also involved a personal injury suit arising from the collapse of Hyatt Hotel's skywalks.
Citing Firestone, the Missouri Supreme Court reinstated the remitted portion of the jury verdict.
13. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578) (Judge Story denied defendant's motion for a
new trial when the plaintiff accepted a $500 remittitur on a $2,000 jury verdict).
14. Judge Story did cite two English cases in support of the court's power to grant a new trial if
the court determines that damages are excessive. Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277, 128 Eng. Rep.
696 (1813); Chambers v. Caulfield, 6 East 244, 102 Eng. Rep. 1280 (1805). In Chambers, the court
recognized a judicial duty to grant a new trial if the verdict indicated that the jury acted under the
influence of prejudice, gross error, or misconception. 6 East at 256, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1285. In
Hewlett, however, the court acknowledged that it is extremely difficult for the courts to interfere by
granting a new trial. 5 Taunt. at 280-81, 128 Eng. Rep. at 698. Neither Hewlett nor Chambers
resulted in a new trial.
15. 116 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1886). The Court stated that the power of remittitur was a matter
within the discretion of the judge, citing Blunt and two state court cases, Hayden v. Florence Sewing
Mach. Co., 54 N.Y. 221 (1873) (tenant agreed to remit the portion of the verdict that the appellate
court found represented lost profits suffered as a result of a wrongful eviction) and Doyle v. Dixon,
97 Mass. 208 (1867) (in an action for breach of contract, plaintiff agreed to remit the portion of the
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the authority and rationale behind the power.' 7 Nevertheless, the Court
reluctantly approved of the power in dicta, primarily because federal
courts had uniformly applied the doctrine for more than a hundred
years. 18
Despite acceptance of the power by the Supreme Court, several lower
courts have expressed concern that it may undermine the constitutional
right to a determination of the facts by a jury.' 9 Consequently, courts
verdict that the trial judge found to be excessive). Neither state case referred to any common-law
rule supporting the doctrine.
The Court continued to approve of the power of remittitur in subsequent cases. See, ag., Union
Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 334 (1918); Tevis v. Ryan, 233 U.S. 273, 290 (1914); Gila Valley
G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103-05 (1914); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307,
312 (1911); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1895); Lewis v.
Wilson, 151 U.S. 551, 555 (1894); Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682, 690 (1892); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131
U.S. 22, 29 (1889); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74 (1889).
16. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
17. In the last analysis, the sole support for the decisions of this Court and that of Mr.
Justice Story, so far as they are pertinent to cases like that now in hand, must rest upon the
practice of some of the English judges-a practice which has been condemned as opposed
to the principles of the common law by every reasoned English decision, both before and
after the adoption of the Federal constitution, which we have been able to find.
Id. at 484 (emphasis in the original). See also Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 248, 95
Eng. Rep. 790, 792-93 (1764) (denying English courts the power to abridge damages in personal tort
actions); Watt v. Watt, [1905] All E.R. 840, 843 (expressly overruling the few English cases that had
approved of the remittitur power).
In Beardmore, the court drew a distinction between cases of liquidated damages, such as breach of
contract, in which the damages may be objectively measured, and personal tort cases in which the
damages are a matter of opinion. The court suggested that a judge may correct excessive verdicts in
cases of liquidated damages, but not in tort cases. 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 248, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792. In
Watt, the court abolished the doctrine in tort cases but did not address the propriety of remittitur in
cases of liquidated damages.
18. In the light reflected by the foregoing review of the English decisions and commenta-
tors, it, therefore, may be that if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first
time, it would be decided otherwise. But, first announced by Mr. Justice Story in 1822, the
doctrine has been accepted as the law for more than a hundred years and uniformly applied
in the federal courts during that time. And, as it finds some support in the practice of the
English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution, we may assume that in a case
involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine would not be reconsidered or
disturbed at this late day.
293 U.S. at 484-85.
19. See, eg., Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting). But see Arkansas Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74 (1889) ("The practice
•.. [of remittitur] is sustained by sound reason and does not, in any just sense, impair the constitu-
tional right of trial by jury.").
The seventh amendment provides for the right of trial by jury: "no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. For the Supreme Court's treatment of this issue, see supra note 48
and accompanying text. Missouri also guarantees a right to a jury trial: "The right of trial by jury,
as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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have imposed various limitations upon the judicial exercise of the remitti-
tur power.20 Several federal courts have limited the judge's discretion in
setting reasonable damages in a remittitur action. For example, some
courts have applied a "maximum reasonable award" standard.2 t Under
this standard, a judge must award the plaintiff the maximum amount
that the jury could have awarded. 22 Other courts have imposed a "mini-
mum reasonable award" standard, under which a judge must reduce an
excessive verdict to the minimum amount that the jury could have
awarded.23 Still other courts have allowed the trial judge to substitute
his view of a reasonable award for the excessive jury verdict. 4
Despite these limitations, the power of remittitur remains established
within the federal and state court systems. Although rare instances exist
in which state courts have refused to apply the doctrine,25 an overwhelm-
ing majority of state courts exercise the remittitur power.
In 1831, the Missouri Supreme Court first recognized the power of
remittitur in McAllister v. Mullanphy.26 Sixty-three years later in Burdict
v. Missouri Pacific Railway,27 the court upheld the doctrine, 28 but two
20. See, eg., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1889) (court cannot, according to its own
estimate, reduce the amount of damages and enter an absolute judgment; it must give the plaintiff the
choice of making a remittitur or accepting a new trial); Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 512 F.2d 671,
673 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("I would have the district court judge bear the burden
of substantiating his estimation of damages by making findings of fact and explicating the theory or
rationale for the damages.").
21. See, eg., Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1043-46 (5th Cir. 1970)
(trial court erred in substituting its view of a reasonable award instead of determining the maximum
award that the jury could reasonably find). See also 3 BARRON & HoLsToFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1305.1 (Wright ed. 1958) (describing the different standards used in determining
the amount of the remittitur).
22. 429 F.2d at 1046.
23. See, eg., Meissner v. Papas, 35 F. Supp. 676, 677 (D.C. Wis. 1940), affd, 124 F.2d 720
(1941).
24. See, e.g., Grobengieser v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 94 F. Supp. 402 (D.C. Pa. 1950); Raske v.
Raske, 92 F. Supp. 348 (D.C. Minn. 1950).
25. See, eg., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Earl's Adm'x, 94 Ky. 368, 22 S.W. 607 (1893). The court
stated that if an award is excessive, a new trial must be granted. Reduction of an excessive verdict by
a trial judge is not permissible. A subsequent case, Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Meyers, 150 Ky. 841,
845-46, 151 S.W. 19, 21 (1912), explained that the general rule stated in Earl' sAdm'x does not apply
when the items constituting the damages are separable, because the court can accurately determine
those damages not properly recoverable. In such cases, the court may use the power of remittitur to
correct the verdict.
26. 2 Mo. 28, 28 (1831) ("[Tihe plaintiff in ejectment may enter a remittiter [sic), where the
finding is for too much, to avoid a new trial.").
27. 123 Mo. 221, 27 S.W. 453 (1894) (en bane). In Burdict, the trial court overruled the de-
fendant's motion for a new trial after the plaintiff agreed to remit a portion of the jury verdict. On
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strong dissents challenged the remittitur power as an unconstitutional
infringement on the right to a jury trial.29 One dissenting judge3 ° argued
that the remittitur power should not be exercised at the appellate level
because appellate courts have no power to review questions of fact, such
as the proper sum to be awarded as compensation for pain and suffering
in personal injury cases. 3 As the final reviewing authority on disputed
issues of fact, the trial judge, on the other hand, could grant a remitti-
tur.32 Another dissenting judge33 argued that the remittitur power con-
travenes the general rule that the responsibility of assessing damages is
wholly within the province of the jury. 4 The judge noted that the power
might be exercised with respect to liquidated damages because the grant-
ing of liquidated damages is a question of law rather than of fact.35
For a period of ninety-one years after the dissenting opinions in
Burdict, no Missouri Supreme Court opinion expressly advocated abol-
ishing the power of remittitur in Missouri. In Firestone v. Crown Center
Redevelopment Corp. ,36 however, the Missouri Supreme Court abolished
the power. Judge Higgins, writing for the majority,37 found the trial
judge's remittitur an abuse of discretion.38 He noted that the jury is
appeal, the court still found the damages excessive and ordered a reversal unless the plaintiff would
agree to a further reduction. The case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court, which af-
firmed the additional reduction and approved the power of remittitur.
28. Id. at 238-43, 27 S.W. at 456-58. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that
although conflicting authorities existed, the trend of modem judicial opinion was to allow the power
of remittitur at both the trial and appellate levels. The remittitur power, according to Justice Black,
allowed the court to "work out substantial justice by avoiding, as far as possible, the long delays and
accumulated costs incident to reversals and repeated trials." Id. at 242-43, 27 S.W. at 458.
29. Id. at 243-70, 27 S.W. at 458-66.
30. Id. at 243-59, 27 S.W. at 458-63 (Barclay, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 245, 27 S.W. at 459.
32. Id. at 259, 27 S.W. at 463 ("In Missouri, the trial courts are the final reviewing authorities
on disputed issues of fact, in law cases, and have been for many years .... The responsibility for
that part of the administration of justice rests upon them, and not with this court.").
33. Id at 260-70, 27 S.W. at 463-66 (Gantt, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 260, 27 S.W. at 463.
35. Id. at 261, 27 S.W. at 463 (when the damages are unliquidated, "[i]t is the peculiar province
of the jury to decide such cases under appropriate instructions from the court; and the law does not
recognize in the latter the power to substitute its own judgment for that of the jury.") (emphasis in
the original).
36. 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
37. Id. Chief Judge Rendlen, Judges Billings and Donnoly, Special Judge Dowd, and Senior
Judge Morgan joined the majority opinion. Judge Welliver dissented. Judges Gunn and Blackmar
did not take part in the decision. Id. at 110.
38. Id.
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vested with broad discretion in fixing fair and reasonable compensation,39
and the evidence of Firestone's injuries supported the fifteen million dol-
lar jury verdict.' Therefore, the record did not authorize the trial court
in its exercise of reasonable discretion to order a remittitur.41
After reversing the trial court for abuse of discretion, the Missouri
Supreme Court concluded that the power of remittitur should be abol-
ished.42 Judge Higgins noted that no rule or statute provided for the
power of remittitur.43 Moreover, courts had applied the doctrine incon-
sistently, resulting in irreconcilable case-by-case evaluations. 44
The Court explained that abolishing the power of remittitur would not
eliminate the trial court's ability to control jury verdicts.45 Trial courts
could still grant a new trial if the verdict was excessive or if the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence.46
In light of the strong commitment to trial by jury in the United
States,4 7 the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to prohibit future judi-
cial readjustments of jury verdicts appears prudent. Arguably, the power
of remittitur allows the judge to infringe upon the plaintiff's right to a
jury trial because the plaintiff is forced to accept a judgment less than
that awarded by the jury.48 The inconsistent results obtained through
39. Id. at 109-10 (citing Graeff v. Baptist Temple of Springfield, 573 S.W.2d 291, 309 (Mo.
1978)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at I10.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See Mo. R. CIV. PROC. 78.02 ("Only one new trial shall be allowed on the ground that
the verdict is against the weight of evidence."). The court cited Mo. R. CIV. PROC. 78.01, which
expressly authorizes the judiciary to grant a new trial:
The court may grant a new trial of any issue upon good cause shown. A new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues after trial by jury, court
or master. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact or make new findings, and direct the entry of a new judgment.
47. Id. In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935), Justice Sutherland stated:
The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, charterized by Blackstone as "the glory of the
English law" and "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy"....
Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a
place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.
48. The Supreme Court has declared that a plaintiff's right to a jury trial is not undermined by
the remittitur power, in part because the plaintiff can still choose to undergo a new trial. Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). Arguably, however, a plaintiff has little or no choice in the
matter. Injured plaintiffs may feel pressured into agreeing to a remittitur in order to pay medical
[Vol. 64:271
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remittitur strongly suggest that a judge is no better able to assess dam-
ages than a jury.4 9 This is especially true in personal injury cases, like
Firestone, when damages compensate for injuries that are difficult to as-
sess, such as pain and suffering and emotional distress. Thus, unless the
judge believes that damages are so excessive as to require a new trial on
every issue, perhaps the judge should rely on the jury's determination of
what fairly and reasonably compensates the plaintiff for injuries
sustained.
The Firestone court's broad prohibition, however, suggests that the
court's holding may extend beyond personal injury cases. The language
of the opinion indicates that the court intended to abolish the remittitur
power at both the trial and appellate levels and for awards of liquidated
damages as well as unliquidated damages.5 0 Previous cases questioning
the power of remittitur as an unlawful usurpation of the jury's function,
however, often approved of the power for awards of liquidated dam-
ages. 51 In that situation, the remittitur power allows the judge to correct
blatant errors in the verdict without causing the unnecessary expense of a
expenses and to avoid the additional expenditures of time that another trial would require. Still,
abolishing the power of remittitur would force plaintiffs to accept the additional expense of a new
trial and perhaps a lower verdict. On the other hand, if the next verdict is the same, the plaintiff,
defendant, and court have all spent additional time and money to reach the same result. Further-
more, this verdict will have to stand, see Mo. R. Civ. PRoc. 78.02, supra note 46, even though the
court has decided the verdict is unlawfully excessive.
49. Compare Kenton, supra note 12, with Firestone. Although both Firestone and Kenton were
injured in the Hyatt skywalk collapse, the extent of their injuries differed. Kenton suffered a broken
neck, causing initial paralysis. Surgery and treatment have enabled her to walk with crutches, but
she continues to suffer from weakness, sensory loss, reduced breathing capacity, and other physical
and emotional traumas. She will continue to need physical and psychiatric care. 693 S.W.2d at 97.
The jury awarded Kenton $4,000,000 in compensatory damages, but the trial judge ordered a
$250,000 remittitur. Kenton agreed to the remittitur, but sought reinstatement of the jury verdict
when the defendant appealed. Id. at 85-86. Arguably, the jury verdicts, not the remittiturs, are
inconsistent. In Burdict, the majority opinion upheld the doctrine of remittitur in part because
"[c]ommon experience teaches us that verdicts differ widely... [and the court] is in a position to be
able to judge when a verdict is so far beyond those usually allowed in like cases as to be excessive."
123 Mo. at 242, 27 S.W. at 458. Therefore, the disparity between the Firestone remittitur and the
Kenton remittitur may be the result of the trial court's effort to reconcile two inconsistent jury
verdicts.
50. Firestone failed to distinguish between liquidated and unliquidated claims. Personal injury
cases usually involve unliquidated claims because damages are a matter of opinion. Breach of con-
tract cases normally involve liquidated claims in which the law determines the damages. See
Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 224, 248, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792-93 (1764).
51. See, e.g., id. See also Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 123 Mo. 221, 260-70, 27 S.W. 453, 463-
66 (Gantt, J., dissenting). The Firestone court cited Judge Gantt's dissent in Burdict with approval.
Arguably then, the Firestone holding may be limited to personal injury cases.
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new trial.52
Although Firestone failed to explore the power of remittitur in depth,
the Missouri Supreme Court nevertheless has become the first court to
abandon a doctrine accepted in every jurisdiction in the United States.
Future Missouri decisions may strictly interpret Firestone to apply only
to awards of compensatory damages in personal injury cases. If the
court's decision prompts other courts to reconsider the doctrine, Fire-
stone will stand as a landmark decision for the abolishment of the remitti-
tur power.
A.L.H.
52. In Hayden v. Florence Sewing Mach. Co., 54 N.Y. 221 (1872), a wrongful eviction case, the
court allowed the jury to consider both damages to the plaintiff's property and damages to his busi-
ness in the form of lost profits. The jury included both elements in its verdict. The court determined
that it was error as a matter of law to allow the jury to include lost profits in its verdict. The court
corrected the verdict by merely deducting the sum representing the lost profits. The plaintiff, know-
ing that a new trial would result in the court's withholding the issue of lost profits from the jury,
agreed to the remittitur.
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